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Abstract
A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We
provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat
rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities
this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose
rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable
of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to
take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond
the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military
in the future.
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1 Introduction
One of the most striking facts of the post-World War II international politics is the unusually
long average duration of civil wars. 1 Some scholars (e.g., Hironaka, 2008, Kalyvas, 2006) argue
that this is largely due to the proliferation of politically weak states since World War II and
the onset of decolonization.- While the link between politically weak states, which lack the
Weberian monopoly of violence, and persistence of civil wars is compelling, it raises another
major question: why has the political weakness of many post-World War II states persisted? 3
In this paper, we provide an explanation for why civil wars may persist in weakly-institutionalized
polities. Central to our explanation is the political moral hazard problem generated by a strong
military (Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010a). In weakly-institutionalized polities, the
checks that would prevent a strong military from intervening in domestic politics are absent.
This makes the building of a strong army a double-edge sword for many civilian governments,
even if such an army is necessary for defeating rebels and establishing the monopoly of violence
over their territory.
We formalize these ideas using a simple dynamic game. The civilian government is con-
trolled by an elite, which derives rents from holding power. It faces armed rebellion from an
opposition group (e.g., a group of different ethnicity or religion). The minimum scale of the
army is insufficient for ending this armed rebellion and establishing the monopoly of violence.
The elite can instead choose a larger size army, which will end the civil war, but this will also
increase the role of the military in domestic politics. The civilian government-military inter-
action is complicated by the fact that the elite cannot credibly commit to not reforming and
downsizing the military once the civil war is over. Consequently, a stronger military, which is
necessary for defeating the rebels, may also attempt a coup. Thus the elite often face a choice
Civil wars during the nineteenth and early twentieth century were usually relatively short; the average
length of a civil war between 1900 and 1944 was one and half years. After World War II, the average duration
of civil wars has tripled to over four years. The number of ongoing civil wars has also increased dramatically
since 1945. For example, an average of about twenty civil wars per year were ongoing concurrently in the 1990s,
corresponding to a rate approximately ten times the historical average since the nineteenth century. The surge
in the number of ongoing civil wars has been mainly due to the increase in average duration rather than in the
rate of outbreak of new conflicts. See, e.g., Hironaka (2008).
"Many political scientists point out that decolonization increased the number of independent states, but
many new states lacked the monopoly of coercion and the political capacity common among Western states
(see, e.g., Herbst, 2004, Centeno, 2002).
Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos-Villagran (2009) argue that weakness of central governments may arise
as an equilibrium outcome when non-state armed actors provide support to one of the factions competing for
control of the central government.

between a persistent civil war versus the risk of a coup. Our framework also points out to
another strategy for the elite: to build an over-sized army as a commitment to not reforming
the military after the end of the civil war (since the over-sized army is strong enough to resist
any attempt to reform). This suggests that in weakly-institutionalized polities both the persis-
tence of civil wars and the emergence of over-sized armies with excessive influence on domestic
politics are possible equilibrium outcomes. 4
Our analysis shows that when the elite's rents are relatively unaffected by its lack of
monopoly of violence, for example, because the civil war is in a remote area or it does not
interfere with their control of natural resources, then the elite will be unwilling to build a
strong army. In contrast, when the rebels pose a more costly threat to their rents, the elite is
more likely to build a strong army, either risking the possibility of a coup after the end of the
civil war or accepting excessive concessions to an over-sized army.
Our framework also generates a novel substitutability between fiscal and political capacity
of the state. While these capacities are generally thought to be complements (e.g., Besley
and Persson, 2009), in our model higher fiscal capacity raises the equilibrium cost of building
strong armies (because it makes military dictatorships both more likely and more costly to the
elite) and via this channel, it contributes to the persistence of civil wars.
Our work is related to several different literatures in comparative politics. The large litera-
ture on the causes of civil wars is surveyed in Blattman and Miguel (2009). Fearon and Laitin
(2003) and Herbst (2004), among others, emphasize the role of weak states in the emergence of
civil wars, while the duration of civil wars is studied in Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2004),
de Rouen and Sobek (2004), Hegre (2004), Fearon (2007), Powell (2004, 2009) and Yared
(2009). Our paper is also related to the small economics literature on weakly-institutionalized
polities, the problems of weak states, and the analysis of state formation, including Acemoglu,
Robinson and Verdier (2004), Acemoglu (2005), Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010b), and
Besley and Persson (2009), and to the political economy literature on regime transitions (see,
e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin, 2009). Our analysis of
the political moral hazard problem between the civilian government and the military builds
An illustrative example of a regime unwilling to build a strong army despite ongoing civil wars, most likely
because of fear of increasing the power of the military in the future, is Zaire (Congo) under Mobutu (e.g.,
Snyder, 1992). An example of a regime building an over-sized army is Egypt under Mubarak in his fight against
Muslim Brotherhood (Owen, 2004). An example of a regime building a strong army to fight communist rebels
and then facing a coup is the Philippines under Marcos.
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on Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010a). The closely related and complementary work by
Besley and Robinson (2010) also emphasizes the cost of concessions that the civilian govern-
ment must make to the military and analyze the choice between strong armies and "tinpot"
militaries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our basic model. Section 3
contains some preliminary results and Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium and present our
main results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a society consisting of four social groups, the elite, E, the citizens, L, the rebels,
5R, and the military, M. Each agent j at time t = maximizes
oo
EoXyfe,i + rj,t), (!)
t=o
where Eo is the expectation at time t = 0, j3 € (0, 1) is the discount factor, Cj >t > denotes the
consumption of the final good (equal to disposable income), and Tjj, > is a rent appropriated
by each individual whose group is in power at time t, representing non-monetary payoffs from
holding power or returns from natural resources or other income sources.
The size of the elite is normalized to 1. The size of the citizens is equal to n, while the
size of the military, which will be determined endogenously, is x t at time t. For simplicity, we
assume that only the citizens are recruited into the army, and that x e {xe,xm ,Xh}, where
X£ < xm < Xh < n. The minimum size of the army, X(, is necessary for maintaining law and
order and national defence. An army of size larger than the minimum level X( can be chosen to
deal with the rebels as explained further below. For reasons that will become obvious shortly,
we refer to Xh as an "over-sized army" . Each elite agent has productivity a, and each citizen
has a productivity A < a. Citizens recruited into the military do not produce any income.
There are three political states St € {W, D,A1}, W corresponds to a civilian regime with
civil war (rebellion); D is a civilian regime (democracy) without rebellion; and M is a military
dictatorship. The civilian government, with or without rebellion, is ruled by the elite and can
either represent a democracy (including a captured democracy) or a non-democratic regime
ruled by an oligarchy. Instead, in a military dictatorship, the military commander (or a group
Payoff-relevant states will be given by elements of {W,D,M} x {xe,Xm,Xh}-

of officers) is in power. Since our focus is on the persistence of civil wars, we assume that
the initial political state is so = W—a civilian regime under a rebellion. If the rebellion is
defeated, there will be a transition to s = D, but the military can attempt a coup against
democracy and cause a transition to s = M. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the
military dictatorship is absorbing: once we have s = M, this will apply in all future dates. We
also assume that a military coup is not possible starting from s = W. Thus possible transitions
are W-*.D-*M.
Both civil war and coups cause economic inefficiencies. Civil war disrupts economic trans-
actions and reduces all incomes by a factor 6 £ [0, 1], so that the income of each elite becomes
(1 — 5)a and that of each citizen is (1 — 6) A. Similarly, the military is not equipped to run the
economy, and thus under a military dictatorship, all incomes are reduced by a factor
<fi £ [0, 1].
The government collects revenues with proportional taxation Tf £ [0, 1], and these revenues
are used to pay the salaries of soldiers. We model tax distortions in a simple way, assuming that
there are no costs of taxation until some rate f > 0, and after t = f, taxation is prohibitively
costly (this makes f the peak of the Laffer curve). The government budget constraint, which
must be satisfied at each period, thus takes the form
w(x t \s t )x t < T(x t \s t )(a t +(n- x t )A t ), (2)
where w(x t \s t ) and T(x t \s t ) denote the military wage and the tax rate with an army of size x t
in the political state s t .
We next describe transitions in greater detail. As noted above, we start in so — W. There
is a transition to s = D when the rebellion (civil war) is defeated, and for simplicity, there is
no further possibility of another rebellion. The probability that the rebellion will be defeated
is a function of the strength of the state (the size of the army). In particular, we assume that
the civil war ends with probability p(x) £ [0, 1] in each period, where
p(x( ) = p < p{xm ) = p(xh ) = 1.
This implies that when x t = xg, there is a "high likelihood," probability 1 —p, that the civil war
will persist because of the weakness of the state. In contrast, a moderate or an over-sized army
is sufficient to end the civil war immediately. In addition, however, strong armies, x £ {xm , x^},
can undertake a coup against the civilian government once the civil war is defeated. This makes
them a double-edge sword for the incumbent civilian government, for they defeat the rebels,

but may attempt a coup after the end of the conflict. The difference between intermediate-sized
strong army, xm , and the over-sized strong army, x^, is that the former can be downsized by
the civilian government, and the probability that civilian government can do this within any
given period is equal to A
€ [0, 1]. In contrast, an over-sized army, x = x^, is strong enough to
withstand any attempt to reform and can thus never be reformed and downsized by a civilian
government. The initial size of the military, xq, is decided by the civilian government at the
beginning of time t = 0.
We also assume that each soldier has to put effort, which costs h > 0, in fighting the rebels.
If he does not do so, he is caught with probability q e (0, 1), and is punished by losing his
wage for one period. This imperfect monitoring technology will lead to "efficiency wages" for
soldiers during times of civil war. 6
We represent the economy described so far as a dynamic game between the soldiers and
the elite. The rebels and the citizens do not play an active role because of our simplifying
assumptions, and there is no conflict within groups, so that we can suppose that decisions
are taken by a representative agent from each group (e.g., the commander of the army and a
representative elite agent in a civilian government).
More formally, the timing of events starting in s t = W or D is as follows:
1. The civilian government chooses the size Xf of the army, sets taxes Tt and military wages
Wt subject to the constraint that Xt = x r -i, either if Xt-\ = Xjr or if the state of the world at
time t is such that the army cannot be reformed, and subject to the budget constraint (2).
Then if st = W:
2. The rebels are defeated with probability p(xt) and the civil war ends permanently,
inducing a transition to st+i = D. Otherwise, St+i = W, and the same sequence of events is
repeated.
If s t = D:
2. If x t-\ = xm and the state of the world is such that the military can be reformed, the
civilian government decides whether or not to reform it (if there is no reform, then x t = xm ).
If xt = xm or Xt = Xh, the military decides whether to attempt a coup against the civilian
government. A coup succeeds with probability 1, inducing a transition to s t = M.
The imperfect monitoring assumption and the resulting efficiency wage simplify the exposition. Without
this feature, the participation constraint of soldiers would be binding during the civil war, and thus wages would
depend on expectations of future coups and military wages. Allowing for perfect monitoring or for more severe
punishments do not affect our general results.

In state St = M, which is absorbing, the military government chooses taxes and military
wages subject to the government budget constraint (2).
In the following, we characterize the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of the dynamic
political game between the elite and the military. As a first step in this characterization, we
write the values (discounted present value) of the players as functions of payoff-relevant state
variables (st,x t ), where s t G {W,D,M} and xt G {xg,xm ,Xh}.
3 Values and Strategies of the Military
Let us start in the political state s = W. Since fighting against the rebels requires an effort
cost h for each soldier and shirking is detected only with probability q, the incentive compatible
equilibrium military wage during the civil war needs to be at least h/q (see Acemoglu, Ticchi
and Vindigni, 2010b). We assume that this wage also satisfies the participation constraint
ensuring that citizens are weakly better off as soldiers than as producers (for example, h/q >
(1 — f()A, with f( defined in (3), would be sufficient for this). Taking into account the
income disruption generated by the civil war, the tax rate that satisfies the government budget
constraint (2) must be
- iorie{l,m,h}, (3){l-6){a + (n-Xi)A)q
provided that this tax rate is less than the maximum feasible rate, f
.
Next consider the political state s = D. If x = xg, then coups are not feasible and effort
is no longer necessary, thus military wages will be determined by the participation constraint,
which makes a soldier indifferent between working as a civilian and working as a soldier, i.e.,
we = (1 — T() A, where Tg is the equilibrium tax rate in this case. Consequently, the value of
a soldier and the value of a civilian under democracy and x = X( are
VM {D, Xi ) = VL (D, Xi)= {
-^^, (4)
where the tax rate T( balancing the government budget (2) is T( = X(A/(a + nA).
When x G {xmi Xh\^ the army may attempt a coup against the democratic government in
the state Sj = D, that is, after the rebels have been defeated. Consequently, in these cases the
elite need to take into account the strategy of the military to set fiscal policy. In particular,
as in Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010a), there will be a no coup constraint of the form:
V AI {D,x,\coup) < VM (D,x 1 |nocoup) for i G {m, h) , (5)
6

which the elite must satisfy if they wish to prevent coups; VM (D, Xjjcoup) and VM (D,Xi\no coup)
denote the values of soldiers with an army size of Xi when they undertake a coup and when
they choose not to do so. To derive the implications of the no coup constraint, first consider a
military regime, and let R denote the rents that soldiers receive in such a regime. Recall that
this regime is absorbing and since there are no costs of taxation until f , soldiers will set this
tax rate and redistribute the proceeds as wages to themselves. Therefore,
VM (M, Xl)= R + f{1
-
& <"+ <n " *'> A) /X > forzGim,/,}, (6)
which takes into account that incomes are reduced by a fraction <p, because the military is
running the economy, and only n — x,; citizens are working in production. The proceeds from
taxation are distributed equally among the soldiers, thus the division by X{ in the denominator.
Consider next the case where x = Xh (with s = D). If the elite do not prevent coups,
the value to the military is VM (D, x/j|coup) = VM (M, Xh) as given by (6) for i = h. Al-
ternatively, the elite could pay an "efficiency wage" to the soldiers, w£, to make it worth for
them not to attempt coups—i.e., to satisfy the no coup constraint, (5). When x = Xh, the
expression for the efficiency wage is straightforward to derive, since there is no possibility of
reforming the military. Therefore, the value to the military when the elite pay such a wage is
V (D,Xh\no coup) = wfi + f3VM (D,Xh\coup), where w£ is the level of the efficiency wage
that makes (5) hold as equality, and this expression takes into account that in the next period
the military must receive the value that it can get with a coup (either by undertaking a coup, or
because the elite will pay them the necessary efficiency wage). This implies that the efficiency
wage w^ will be given by
P f{l-(j))(a + {n-xh )A)wh = + R, (7)
and the tax rate that satisfies the government budget constraint in this case is
rf = »(l-fl+ *** .. . (8)a+ (n - Xh) A
However, it may not be feasible for the civilian government to pay such high wages to
soldiers because in the government budget constraint, (2), we need to have r < f. Hence, coup
prevention with an army of size x^ is feasible only if w^x^ < f (a + (n — x/,) A). Thus from
(7), we obtain that coups starting with x = x^ can be prevented provided that
* * < JhR nn s ^- (9)t (a+ (n- Xh) A)
7

Let us next consider the case where x = xm (again with s = D). If the elite prevent coups
by paying an efficiency wage wm , then the value to each soldier is:
7
VM (D, xm \no coup) = w? + (3{W L (D, xe) + (1 - X)VM (D, xjcoup)],
which now takes into account that with probability A, there will be an opportunity to reform
and downsize the military, and the civilian government will use this opportunity, and thereafter,
soldiers will receive the value V (D,xe) as given by (4). If there is no opportunity to reform,
then the soldiers will receive the value from a coup (either because they will undertake a coup
or because the no coup constraint, (5), will be satisfied with equality). Using (4) and (5), we
can compute VM(D,xm\no coup) = [w^ + /?A(1 - re)A/{l - /?)]/(l - /3(1 - A)). The value
from a coup is given by (6). Repeating the same analysis as above, we find that with an army
of size x = Xm, it will be feasible to satisfy the no coup constraint, (5) only when: 8
(1 - Te )xmA
>
^
0(1 -A)
" C (10)T(a + (n-xm )A)\ f(a + (n-xm )A)
To save space, in the remainder, we impose the following assumption, which allows us to
focus on the more novel and economically interesting cases.
Assumption 1 (1) Rm < R < R^, where &h = f(a + (n — Xfl )A)/xi1 and Rm = {3A(1 —
xeA/{a + nA)) + (1 - /3)f(o + (n - xm ) A)/xm .
(2) 4>£ [4>*h ,\] and Xe (A*,l].
(3) j3 > P* , where /3* < 1 is implicitly defined by the following equation (3*A(1 — X(A/(a +
nA)) + (1 - P*)f(a + (n - xm )A)/xm = f(a + (n - xh)A)/xh .
The first part of Assumption 1 states that military rents in military dictatorship are in-
termediate, so that military dictatorships are not desirable when soldiers know that they will
have sufficient influence in the civilian regime, that is, they will receive efficiency wages without
any risk of downsizing, but are worthwhile when they do not receive efficiency wages. More
specifically, R < Rh ensures that 4>*h < 1 so that for values of </> G [$£, 1] it will be feasible
to satisfy (5) and to prevent coups with an over-sized army (x = xt)- In contrast, Rm < R
' This is the value of soldiers after the realization of the state of nature that the military cannot be reformed.
In this case, the efficiency wage wm necessary for prevention is
W* = (1-/3(1- \))[T{l-<t>){a + (n-xm )A)/xm + R\/(\ - /?) - /3A(1 -T t )A/(\ - /3), and the tax rate
balancing the government budget is
r£ = (1 - /3(1 - A))[f (1 - (f) + xm R/(a + (n - xm )A)}/(\ - /3) - p\[xm /(a + (n - xm ) A)} (1 - re ) A/(l - p).

ensures that preventing coups with an intermediate-sized army (x = xm ) is not feasible when
the probability of potential reform, A, is sufficiently high (i.e., <p*m > 1 as A approaches to 1).
In particular, let A* be defined as the value of A such that <\>*m = 1. Then this assumption
implies that when A 6 (A*, 1], (10) can never be satisfied and coups cannot be prevented with
intermediate-sized army. The second part of the assumption then imposes that <p G [<££, 1] so
that prevention of coups with over-sized military is indeed feasible, and A £ (A*, 1] so that
coup prevention with an intermediate-sized military is never feasible. Finally, the third part of
the assumption ensures that Rm < R^, so that the first part of the assumption is meaningful.
4 Characterization of the MPE
In this section we characterize the MPE of the dynamic political game by determining what
type of army the elite will choose as a response to the ongoing civil war.
The expected value to the elite when there is a civil war and the size of the military is
x = X( can be written as
VE {W, xt ) = (1 - ft) (1 - S)a + f + 15 [PV
E (D, xe ) + (1 - p) VE (W, xt )] ,
where f( is given by (3) and f is the rent accruing to the elite when they are in power but there
is an ongoing civil war. This expression incorporates the fact that the rebels are defeated with
probability p = p (xg) in each period, and subsequently the continuation value to the elite is
V (D,xg) = ((1 — T()a + r)/(l — /3), where r is the exogenous rent of being in power without a
civil war (since an army of size xg cannot attempt a coup, s = D with x = xe is an absorbing
state). Therefore, the value to the elite of choosing a small army, in the midst of a civil war, is
VE lw , _ (1 - £) ((1 - f*) (1 - fla + f ) + /3p((l -rt)a + r)
{
'
e) ~~ (l-/3)(l-/3(l-p)) Ulj
Given Assumption 1, when the elite choose an army of size x = xm , then coups cannot be
prevented, and thus their value can be written as
VE(W,xm ) = (l-fm )(l-6)a + f + f3
A((l - u)a + r) (1- A) (1 - f) (1
-
:i2)
1-/3 1-/3
where fm is given by (3). This expression takes into account that rebels are defeated in one
period and, in the following period, the army is reformed with probability A, while reforms are
not possible with the complementary probability and the military undertakes a coup.

Finally, if the elite choose x = Xh, their value depends on whether coups will be prevented
in the subgame starting after the defeat of the rebels. Given Assumption 1, such prevention is
feasible, and clearly optimal. Hence, the value to the elite in this case is
VE (W,x h ) = (1 - ffc)(l -5)a + f + /3
(1 ~
1
Tj
^
+ r
,
(13)
where r^ is defined in (8). 9
In light of this discussion, the potential strategies for the elite are: (1) form an over-sized
military (x/i), defeat the rebels, and prevent coups, thus remaining in power but with a very
influential military; (2) form an intermediate army (xm ), defeat the rebels, but face the risk of
military takeover; (3) choose a small army (xe), and thus allow for persistent civil war.
To compare these three options, note that VE (W, xg) = VE (W,xe\p) defined in (11) is
a strictly increasing function of the probability p that a small army [xg] will defeat the
rebels (hence the explicit conditioning on p), while VB (W, Xh) and VE (W, xm) defined in
(13) and (12) are independent of p. This implies that there exists a threshold p 6 [0, 1] such
that VE(W,Xfl ) p VE (W, xg\p = p) whenever p ^ p, and a threshold p* e [0,1] such that
VE (W,xm ) ^ VE (W, xg\p = p*) whenever p ^ p*. It can be verified that both thresholds are
always smaller than 1, because the value to the elite when x = xg and p = 1 is always greater
than their value when choosing Xh and xm . However, these thresholds need not be positive.
In particular, p > only when VE (W, x/,) > VE (W, X(\p = 0), that is, when
(1 _ re ) (1 - S)a < (1 - /?) (1 - fh ) (1 -6)a + p{l- r£) a + /3(r-f). (14)
Otherwise VE {W,Xfl ) < VE (W, xg) for all p € [0, 1], and in this case, a small army (xg) will
always be preferred by the elite to an over-sized one (x^), and by convention, in this case we
set p = 0. Similarly, p* > when
{1-Tt)(l-S)a < {l-0){l-fm){l-S)a+p\(l-Te)a+0(l-\)(l-t){l-4>)a+/3(\r-r), (15)
and thus when this condition is not satisfied, the elite always prefer xg to xm . In what follows,
the reader should bear in mind that both thresholds, p and p* , can be zero.
Let us finally introduce the following condition
(t/i - rm)(l - 5)a < 1-/3 (1
- A)(r + cpa) + {n ~ r(l - <f>))Xa - ^ R
a + (n — Xh)A
(16)
If the elite chose not to prevent a coup, they would receive V (W, x/,) = (1 — T'/iJfl - <5)a + r + j3(l - f)(l
4>)a/(\ — ft), which can be verified to be less than (13).
10

It can be verified that when this condition is satisfied, VE(W,x/l ) > VE (W,xm ), and the elite
prefer an over-sized army to an intermediate one.
We now provide a characterization of the MPE in this dynamic economy. 10
Proposition 1 The political game above has a unique MPE with the following structure.
1. Suppose that (16) is satisfied and p £ [p, 1] or that (16) is not satisfied and p £ \p* , 1].
Then the elite choose a small army, x = xg, and there is persistence of civil war. After
(or if) the civil war ends, the civilian government (the elite) remains in power.
2. Suppose that (16) does not hold and p £ [0,p*), then the elite choose an intermediate-
sized army, x = xm , and the civil war ends immediately, but there is possibility of a
military coup and the formation of a military dictatorship.
3. Suppose that condition (16) is satisfied and p £ [0,p), then the elite choose an over-sized
army, x = x^, the civil war ends immediately, and civilian government remains in power,
but with high wages and concessions for the military.
The following corollary provides comparative statics of the key thresholds.
Corollary 1 The threshold p is nondecreasing in r, S, (ft, and it is nonincreasing in f, f, x^,
R.
The threshold p* is nonincreasing in f, i, <j>, xm , is independent of R, and is nondecreasing
in 5, and also in r if X is high enough and nonincreasing in r otherwise.
Proposition 1 is the main result of the paper. It shows that the elite will choose a small
army, and will not establish a monopoly of violence over its territory, at least for a while, when
p > p or when p > p*—i.e., when a small army is not too ineffective at fighting the rebels.
Note, however, that both thresholds p and p* can be very small or equal to zero, so when a
small army is maintained, the civil war can persist for a very long time (in the limit forever
as p —> 0, if both thresholds are zero). Corollary 1 shows that such an outcome is more likely
when r is low relative to f, that is, when the elite receive significant rents even when the civil
war is ongoing (for example because the civil war is in peripheral areas and does not interfere
1 The argument in the text gives the main idea of the proof of this proposition. A more detailed characteri-
zation of the MPE and a formal proof are provided in the Appendix.
1 1

with the rents that the elite receive from corruption or natural resources). Small armies and
persistent civil wars are also more likely when 5 is low relative to
<f>, making the income loss (of
the elite and of the citizens) relatively small under civil war, and high under military regimes.
Finally, a high f also makes this configuration more likely because of two distinct channels:
first, it makes a military dictatorship more costly to the elite (when these happen along the
equilibrium path); second, it makes a military dictatorship more attractive for soldiers, thus
making it more expensive for the elite to satisfy the no coup constraint (when they prefer to
do so). For reasons related to the second channel, a high level of R (high rents for the military
from controlling the government) also makes the elite more likely to choose a small army and
a weak state. In all cases, the reason why the elite prefer a small army is that they are afraid
of the influence of and a potential coup by a strong army following the end of the civil war.
When the elite decide to fight the rebels more vigorously to end the civil war, they can
do so using one of two different strategies. In the first one, they build an intermediate-sized
army, but because of their inability to commit to not downsizing the army after the civil war
ends, they cannot satisfy the no coup constraint, and there is a positive probability of a coup
along the equilibrium path. In the second one, they build an over-sized army as a commitment
to not reforming the military in the future. This amounts to making permanent concessions
(high wages and other policy concessions) to the military as the price that the elite have to
pay for fighting the rebels and establishing some sort of monopoly of violence. Note, however,
that in this case this monopoly of violence is mostly in the hands of the military not in the
hands of the civilian government.
An interesting implication of the model, again highlighted by Corollary 1, is a novel substi-
tutability between fiscal and political capacity of the state. When f is high, the fiscal capacity
of the state is high. This is generally thought to increase the political capacity of the state
(e.g., Besley and Persson, 2009). However, a higher fiscal capacity also puts more economic
power in the hands of the military if they decide to attempt a coup. Through this channel,
it discourages the civilian government from building a strong military and the monopoly of
violence necessary for political capacity.
Finally, it is also useful to observe that the entire analysis is predicated on the possibility
that the military, once sufficiently large, can take control of the government. In this sense, the
model represents the workings of politics in a weakly-institutionalized polity, which does not
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place major constraints on the exercise of military power.
5 Concluding Remarks
We presented a simple model where civil wars persist because of the endogenous weakness of
the state. The civilian government, assumed to be under the control of an elite, may prefer to
forgo the establishment of the monopoly of violence over its territory, allowing an ongoing civil
war, because, given the weak institutions, the elite are afraid of building a strong military. This
fear is particularly relevant when the civilian government is unable to commit to not reforming
the military after the civil war is over, and this commitment problem makes a military coup
more likely. One, potentially paradoxical, response of the civilian government, when it needs
to prevent the continuation of the civil war, is to build an over-sized army as a commitment
to not reforming the military after the threat of the civil war is gone.
We view this paper as part of our broader research on the interaction between civihan
segments of the society and the military, and on the ability of society to control the use of
force. Our simple model shows how this interaction is affected by an ongoing civil war and at
the same time determines the persistence of the civil war. Other interesting directions would
be to investigate how international relations (including possibility of international wars and
international trade) affect the balance of power between the elite, non-elite elements in the
society and the military, and also how the interplay between the military and civihan branches
of the government may affect the development of the fiscal capacity of the state.
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Appendix
Additional Details on the Characterization of the MPE
We first state a version of our main result, Proposition 1, more formally.
Proposition 2 Define the thresholds p and p* as in the text. When (14) and (15) hold, p
and p* are interior. When (14) does not hold, set p = 0, and (15) does not hold, set p* = 0.
Suppose that p 7^ p and p ^ p* . Then, the political game described in the main text has a
unique MPE with the following structure.
1. Suppose that (a): (16) is satisfied andp € (p, 1], or (b) (16) is not satisfied andp G (p*, 1].
Then when St = W, the elite choose a small army, i.e., xt — xe, set Tt = ft, and pay
military wages given by wt = w = h/q. The civil war ends with probability p in each
period t > 0. After (or if) the civil war ends at some date t, the elite choose xu = xg,
set t u = T(, pay military wages wu = (1 — T()A and su = D (i.e., the elite remain in
power) for all u > t.
2. Suppose that (16) does not hold and p £ [0,p*). Then, at time t = 0, the elite choose
an intermediate-sized army, i.e., xq = xm , set tq = fm , pay military wages given by
wq = w = h/q and the civil war ends in the same period. At time t = 1, the military
can be reformed with probability A, and in this case the elite choose xu = xg, set ru = T(,
pay military wages w u — (1 — T()A and s u = D for all u > 1. With probability 1 — A
the army cannot be reformed, the military undertakes a coup, and a permanent military
dictatorship is established. The military chooses x u = xm , sets tu = f, sets military
wages given by wu = f (1 — <p)(a + (n — xm )A)/xm , and su = M for all u> 1.
3. Suppose that condition (16) is satisfied andp £ [0,p). Then, at time t = 0, the elite
choose an over-sized army, i.e., xq = x^, set tq = ?h, pay military wages Wo = w = h/q,
and the civil war ends in the same period. The military cannot be reformed in all future
periods, i.e., xu = x/,, the elite set t u = r^ and wu = w^ given respectively by (8) and
(7), and su = D for all u > 1.
When p = p* , configurations in parts 1 and 2 are MPEs, and when p = p, configurations
in parts 1 and 3 are MPEs.
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Proof. Condition (16) is obtained from VE {W,x h ) > VE(W,xm ) using (13) and (12) and
rearranging terms. When this condition is satisfied, the elite prefer an over-sized army (rr/,) to
an intermediate one (xm ), so that their choice will be between x = x^ and x = xg. Then, note
that VE (W, xg) = VE (W, X(\p) defined in (11) is a strictly increasing function of the probability
p that a small army (xg) will defeat the rebels, while VE (W, Xh) in (13) is independent on p.
This implies that there exists a threshold p G [0, 1] such that VE (W, £/,) ^ VE (W, X(\p = p)
whenever p ^ p. Moreover, p is always strictly lower than 1 as VE (W, Xh) < V (W, X(\p = 1),
and it is strictly positive if and only if VE (W, x^) > VE (W, xg\p = 0), which is equivalent to
(14). This establishes parts 1(a) and 3 of the proposition.
When condition (16) does not hold, V (W, x^) < VE(W, xm ), the elite prefer an intermediate-
sized army (xm ) to an over-sized one (x^) and, therefore, x = x^ is never chosen. Similarly to
the previous case, from VE (W, xt) increasing in p and VE (W, xm ), defined in (12), independent
on p follows that there exists a threshold p* € [0, 1] such that VE (W, xm ) ^ VE (W, X{\p = p*)
whenever p ~ p*. Again, p* is always strictly lower than 1 as VE (W, xm ) < VE (W, x^\p = 1),
while it is strictly positive if and only if VE (W,xm ) > VE (W,X(\p = 0), which is equivalent
to (15). This establishes parts 1(b) and 2 of the proposition.
When p = p, VE (W,Xh) = VE (W, xq), the elite will have two best responses and con-
figurations in parts 1 and 3 are MPEs. Again, when p = p* , VE (W,xm ) = VE (W, xe), and
configurations in parts 1 and 2 are MPEs.
Proof of Corollary 1
The following relation
£ = VE (W, x e \p) - VE (W, xh ) =
implicitly defines the threshold probability p such that VE {W, x^) ^ VE(W, xe\p = p) whenever
p ^ p. Suppose that this threshold is interior (otherwise, small changes in the parameters would
have no effect on p, and the results in the corollary apply directly).
Using the implicit function theorem, we have that
where
fir Pf\/Ectt7 *.\4C\
> 0. (17)
dp dC/dd
OS
=
dC/dp
dC dV?(W,xe\p)
dp dp
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Then, using (3) and the fact that dr^/dS = 17/(1 — <5) and drh/dS = f/j/(l — 6), we obtain
dVE (W,xe \p)/d5 = -a/ (I - /3(1 -p)) and dVE {W,x h )/d5 = -a. Therefore, we have
dC
=
dVE(W,xe \p) dVE (W,x h ) /3a(l-p)
86
"
9(5 55 l-/3(l-p)
This combined with (17) implies that dp/85 > 0, i.e., that p is increasing in 6 as stated.
Using the same procedure and taking into account (17), we also obtain:
dp/dr = -{dC/dr)/{dC/dp) > as dC/dr = dVE {W,xe \p)/dr - dVE (W,x h)/dr =
-/?(l-p)/(l-/?(l-p))<0.
dp/dr = -{dC/df)/{dC/dp) < as dC/df = dVE {W,x( \p)/df - dVE {W,x h )/df =
/?(l-p)/(l-/3(l-p))>0.
dpldxh = -{dC/dxh )/{d£/dp) <0&sdC/dxh = -dVE (W,x h)/dxh = a{l-6) (8fh/dxh)-
f}a(dT? I'dxh)
I
'(1 — /3) > 0, where in the last expression we have used the fact that dfhjdxh
and drp/dxh are both strictly positive (see (3) and (8)).
dp/dr = -(dC/dt)/{dC/dp) < as dC/df = -dVE {W,xh )/dr = /3a (1 - 0) / (1 - /?) >
0. In the last expression, we have taken into account the expression for r^ in (8) (as we will
also do for the next two cases).
dp/d<f> = -(8jC/8(f>)/{dC/8p) > as dC/d<j> = -dVE {W, x h )/d(p = -par/ (1 - j3) < 0.
dp/dR = -{dC/dR)/{dC/dp) < as dC/dR = -dVE {W,x h )/dR = /3axh /(l - /3)(a +
{n-xh)A) > 0.
This completes the proof of the first part of the corollary.
For the second part, consider the relation
T = VE (W, xe \p*) - VE (W, xm ) =
that implicitly defines the threshold probability p* such that VE(W, xm ) ^ VE (W, xg\p = p*)
whenever p ^ p* Again we consider the case where this threshold is interior. From the implicit
function theorem
dp* df/dS
d6 dT/dp*
because
dT dVE {W,x e \p*)
>0,
>0. (18)
dp* dp*
Since as in the previous case, df(/d5 = f^/(l — S) and dfm/dS = fm /(l — 6), we have
18

dVE (W, xe \p*)/dS = -o/(l - /3(1 - p*)) and dy£(W, xm )/d<5 = -a, and thus
d£
=
aV£(^ arf |p*) aVE(W, xm ) /3a(l-p*)
<9<5
"
55 9(5 1-/3(1-^*)
In order to show that p* is increasing in r if A is high enough and vice versa, note that
d_T_
=
dVE(W,xt \p*)
_
dVE (W,xm )
_
_p_ f P* _ \
dr dr dr 1 - /? \1 - /3{l - p*) J
is monotonically decreasing in A, dJ- /dr > when A = and dJ- /dr < when A = 1. These
observations and (18) imply that dp* /dr = — (dJ-/dr)/(dJ-/dp*) > for high levels of A and
vice versa.
Again, taking into account (18), we have the following results:
dp*/df = -(dT/df)l(dT/dp*) < as dT/df = dVE (W,xe \p*)/df - dVE {W,xm )/df =
/3(l-p*)/(l-/?(l-p*))>0.
dp*/dxm = -(df/dxm)/(dF/dp*) < as dT/dxm = -dVE (W,xm )/dxm = a(l -
5){dfrn/dxm ) > because dfm/dxm > (see (3)).
dp*/df = -{dT/df)/{dT/dp*) < as dT/df = -dVE (W,xm )/df = /3o(l - A)(l -
<p)/(i-p)>o.
dp*/dcf>= -(dF/d(/>)/(dF/dp*) <0asdJr/dcp= -dVE{W,xm)/d^ = 0a(l-f)/(l-0) >
0.
dp*/dR = as VE (W, X(\p*) and VE(W, xm ) are both independent on R.
This completes the second part of the corollary.
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